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ABSTRACT
This paper questions the widely accepted view thatdeficits
have real effects in the life cycle model. Standardanalyses of
deficits within life cycle models treat thegovernment as a
dictatorial entity that can effect any intergenerational
redistribution it desires. In contrast, thispaper drops the
assumption of compulsion and models the government as a coalitionof
self—interested young and old generations whosebargaining
determines government decisions. Since each generation isselfish,
no generation will voluntarily absorb the debts of anotherexcept as
a quid pro quo for receiving particular goods or services.Hence,
redistribution per se between generations will not arise.Because
each generation is ultimately responsible for itsown liabilities,






This paper questions the widely accepted view that deficits
have real effects in the life cycle model. The standardanalysis of
deficit policies within life cycle models treats thegovernment as a
dictatorial entity that can effect any intergenerational
redistribution it desires. In contrast, if one drops theassumption
of compulsion and models the government as a coalition of self
interested parties whose bargaining determinesgovernment decisions,
then redistribution per se among these parties will notarise, and
any transfers between these parties will simply represent payment
for particular goods or services.
The self interested parties comprising the government in the
present analysis are the young and the old. The young and old share
a common interest in a public good, and their representatives
bargain over the amount of financing to be provided by each
generation. Given this decision, the method by which these funds
are raised, whether by issuing debt or levying (lump sum) taxes, is
immaterial, since each generation is responsible for its own
obligations. In addition, while one selfish generationmay absorb
the debt of another, such absorption will always be a quidpro quo
for another payment received or relieved.
The fact that each generation must pay its obligations either
immediately or in the future means that a current cut in taxes paid
by a particular generation will trigger a future increase in that
generations' taxes of equal present value. As in Barro's (1974)
altruism model in which the timing of taxes of effectively—2—
infinitely lived households doesn't matter, the timing per se of the
taxes paid by specific generations has no real effects.
The next section presents a two period life cycle overlapping
generations model in which debt is neutral. The second section
discusses the model's implications. The third section considers
whether the paper's economic view of government is consistent with
existing political institutions. The forth section briefly
summarizes and concludes the paper.
I. A Life Cycle Model with Debt Neutrality
In this two period model, as in Kotlikoff, Perrson, and
Svensson (1986), the members of each generation are identical, and
each generation elects a single representative. The ratio of the
young population to the old population is 1+, and the size of the
old population is normalized to unity. The technology determining
the production of the model's single good is linear. Hence, if the
two generations did not share a desire to consume a public good,
they would be economically independent.
Let Cyt and Cot stand for consumption of the young and old at
time t, respectively. Assuming utility is separable at a point in
time and over time in consumption and public goods, utility of the
young at time t, Uyti and utility of the old, Uot, are given by:
(1) Uy =U(Cyt)+ U(Gt) + TJ(Cot÷i) + (Gt+i)
(2) Uot =tJ(Cot)+ fl(Gt),
where Gt stands for consumption of the public good at time t, and B
is one divided by one plus the rate of time preference.—3—
The lifetime budget constraint confronting theyoung at time t
is:
(3) Cyt + RC0t+i =E+ -Tyt
-RT0t+i,
where R is one divided by one plus the rate of interest,E and E0
are full—time earnings when young and old, and Tyt and T0t+i are
lump sum taxes imposed on generation t when young and old. The
budget constraint of the elderly at time t is:
(4) Cot =AtJR+ E0 -Tot,
where At stands for assets of the elderly at time t, and Tot is the
lump sum tax on the elderly at time t.
The time t indirect utilities of the young, and the old,
Vot, are given by:
(5) Vyt =Vy(Ey+ o -Tyt-RTot+i)+ U(Gt) + U(Gt+i)
(6) Vot =Vo(AtJR+ -Tot)+ U(Gt+1)
The government at any time t consists of a representative of
the young and a representative of the old. They bargain over the
level of Gt, the amount of Gt to be financed by the young,Fyt, and
the amount of Gt to be financed by the old, Fot. The budget
constraining their negotiation is:
(7) Gt (l+i)Fyt + Fot
In addition to financing the amount Fyt of Gt, the young of time t
can anticipate providing financing of FOt+l at time t+l to help pay
for Gt+i. These financing commitments must be paid, in present
value, with taxes. Hence,
(8) Tyt + RTot+i =Fyt+ RFot÷i—4--
Generation t's commitment to pay Fyt can be met either with tax
receipts or receipts from the sale of bonds. Denoting by Dt the
debt issued by generation t, we have:
(9) Dt =Fyt
-Tyt
For the old at time t taxes must be sufficient to cover both the
payment, Fot, for Gt, and the retirement with interest of their
period t-l issue of debt. Thus:
(10) Tot =Fot+ Dt_i/R
Using (8) and (9) one can eliminate the tax terms appearing in the
budget constraints of the young and old:
(3') + RC0.1 =H-Fyt
-RFOt+l
(4') Cot=Wt/R+Eo-Fot
where H stands for the present value of full—time labor earnings and




The indirect utilities of the young and the old at time t can
be rewritten using (3'), (4'), and (7).
(5') Vyt(Fyt, Fot+l, Fot, Fyt+i) =Vy(H
-FytRF'ot+i) +
U((l+ti)Fyt + Fot) +
s8U((l+)Fyt+i + Fot+i)
(6') Vot(Fot,Fyt,Wt) =Vo(Wt/R+ E0 Fot) + U((l+i)Fyt + Fot)
Note that given Wt, the sequence of Fys and F03 for s￿t fully
determines the evolution of the economy.
Next consider unique stationary solutions to this sequential
bargaining problem arising under different bargaining processes.
Given the bargaining process and a unique stationary bargaining—5—
solution, the economy can differ from one period to the next only in
terms of the level of Wt. Hence, each unique stationary solution
can be characterized by two single valued functions
(12) Fyt =fy(Wt)
(13) Fot =fo(Wt)
where the forms of fy( )andf0( )dependon the bargaining process.
To clarify the determination of fy( )andf0( )takeas an
example a cooperative bargaining solution in which the two
representatives maximize a weighted average of the utility of the
young and the utility of the old, where the weightapplied to the
utility of the young and the weight l—z applied to the utility of
the old depend on the level of Wt; i.e., 'Z' =(Wt).Letting t
given in (14) stand for this weighted average, the bargctining
solution involves the maximization at time t of t with respect to
Fyt and Fot.
(14) t ='(Wt)(l+i)Vyt(Fyt, fo(Wt+jjFyt)) iFot,fy(Wt+i(Fyt))) +
(l-4(Wt))Vot(Fot,Fyt,Wt)
Note that the representative of the young at time t will anticipate
the impact of the choice of Fyt on Wt+i and, according to (12) and
(13), on FOt+l and Fyt+l. Hence, fo(Wt÷i (Fyt)) and fy(Wt+l (Fyt))
are substituted for Fot+i and Fyt+j. respectively in
Expressing the optimal choices of Fyt and Fot as functions




Clearly, noncooperative stationary bargaining solutions will
also feature fixed point mappings. Current decisions about Fyt and
Fot given Wt are always made with the knowledge that future
bargaining outcomes depend on Wt+i, and stationarity requires that
the choices of Fyt and Fot when Wt=b be identical to the period t+l
choices of Fyt+l and Fot+i when Wt÷l=.
II. Implications of the Model
The neutrality of debt is implied by the fact that the sequence
of Fyt and Fot depends only on Wt and is independent of the sequence
of Dt. Stated differently, since the solutions to Fyt and Fot can
be determined prior to knowing the sequence of Tyt and Tot, any
reduction in Tyt, according to (8), necessitates an increase in
Tot+i of equal present value. Deficits may arise, but they are not
associated with intergenerational redistribution. In this model
since the young at time t pay Fyt regardless of the size of Dt, the
choice of Dt is essentially an accounting decision to label a
portion of Fyt "taxes" and a portion "borrowing."
In Kotlikoff (1984) and (1986) I argue (1) that in
neoclassical models the labelling of government receipts and
payments as "taxes", "spending", "borrowing", and "debt repayment"
is arbitrary and (2) that with judicious relabelling governments can
maintain their same real policies while reporting essentially any
size deficit or surplus to the public. The point of those
discussions was to stress that one may mistake deficit accounting
policies for real intergenerational redistribution. The current—7—
model has the property that deficits always reflect accounting
policies and are never associated with intergenerational
redistribution.
Since each generation is responsible for its own debt one might
wonder whether any generation would voluntarily absorb (pay of f) the
debt of another. The answer is that given Fyt and Fot, the young at
time t are equally well off if all or part of their payment of Fyt
is spent to retire Dt_i provided the old at time t reciprocate and
spend on Gt the funds they would otherwise have spent retiring Dt_i.
In other words, (7) can be rewritten as:
(7') Gt =((l+)Fyt—Dt_1/R)+(Fot+Dt_i/R),
where the first term in brackets on the right hand side represents
the payment of the young spent on Gt and the second bracketed term
represents the payment of the old spent on Gt.
A related question is whether this model admits long term debt
that is not retired over a large number of time periods. Again the
answer is yes. Take the case of consuls. Suppose (1) that each old
generation sells its consuls to the young generation on the private
market and (2) that the representative of the old transfers to the
representative of the young an amount equal to the value of these
consuls including interest.
III. Is this Economic Model of Government Consistent with
Observed Political Institutions?
In the model of government offered here government decisions
are determined by economic, rather than political factors with each—8—
group's power emanating from its option to operate independently.
Provided that power is not circumscribed, it appears that a wide
range of political institutions could be established that would
affirm and conduct policies determined by economic fundamentals.
Even if political institutions that simply ratify economic
bargains are not established, economic factors may still underlie
political decisions. Suppose, for example, that the government in
power, be it a collection of individuals or a single individual, is
interested in selling political decisions to the highest bidder.
Also assume that the government has the powe to choose any values
of Fyt and Fot provided the utility levels of the young and old are
not reduced below some minimum threat point values. Each age group
will, if necessary, bid up to the point that it is indifferent
between winning the bidding and receiving its minimum utility value.
The age group winning the bidding will instruct the government to
choose those levels of Fyt and Fot that maximize the group's own
utility subject to the other age group receiving its threat point
utility. Hence, the rent seeking activity of the government leads
to efficient provision of the public good and determines precisely
the shares of the public good to be financed by the young and old.
As argued above, given these shares, deficits are neutral.
Of course we don't commonly observe political parties or
politicians representing distinct age groups. In addition to age
differences there are a large number of other differentiating
factors that provide a basis for political groupings. Nevertheless,
in ntaking decisions affecting the interests of the young as a group—9—
and the old as a group governments may either (1) effectively act as
if they consist of young and old representatives who bargain with
each other or (2) sell their decisions to the age group offering to
pay the highest price.
In contrast to positing an economic view of government, the
standard life cycle model appears to assume that the government is
free to engage in any intergenerational policy that it desires,
including, in the limit, totally impoverishing one generation to the
benefit of another. Or, stated differently, the standard model of
government assumes that the economic positions of old and young
generations place no constraints whatsoever on intergenerational
redistribution. While a purely economic model of government may not
be fully realistic, it may more closely approximate reality than a
purely political model in which economic decisions are made
irrespective of economic circumstances and economic desires.
IV. Conclusion
Given the critical assumption of generational selfishness in
the life cycle model, no generation will accept the debts of another
unless it is compensated in one form or another or unless it is
coerced. If coercion is ruled out the issue of government debt is
neutral with each generation having to pay of f, in one form or
another, its ownliabilities.Thus the issue of debt causes a
change in the timing (labelling) of tax payments, but no change in
their present value.—10—
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